Purpose -The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between board structure (consisting of board size, board composition, CEO role duality and chairman composition), investment account holders (IAHs) and social contribution and the bank performance in one of the fastest-growing industries, Islamic banking. Design/methodology/approach -A generalized least square (GLS) regression model was used to investigate such relationship applying data from a sample of 40 Islamic banks operating in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries over the period of 2008 until 2011. Findings -The results show that both size and composition of the board have a negative effect on bank performance. On the other hand, the separation of CEO and chairman roles and the IAHs have no effect, while the chairman independence has a positive impact. As for the control variables, bank size positively influences bank performance whereas leverage has a negative effect. Zakah and gross domestic product produce no significant effect on bank performance. Research limitations/implications -Even though the model has explained the significant part of the variation in performance, there are other factors considered as noise in the model which are unexplained due to the lack of data. As such, other mechanisms of corporate governance (CG) comprising attributes of the remuneration and nominating committees and ownership structure may be used in future research. The sample size is also limited; thus, in future research, the sample size could be increased by including Islamic banks operating in all Middle East countries. Practical implications -The results suggest that to yield a better bank performance, Islamic banks should enhance the effectiveness of CG through the board of directors (BODs), whereby any decisions made by the BODs would lead to greater investors' confidence in the market. The results suggest that policymakers should impose new mechanisms that could impact the effectiveness and compliance of BODs on the code of CG and guidelines of micro-finance, in general, and among Islamic banks, in particular. The community also has the right to know up to what extent are the Islamic banks are in compliance with Shariah principles and rules and the impact of their transactions on the society's welfare. Originality/value -BODs' failures are the primary reason for the recent financial collapses, and Islamic banks are not spared from these events. Even though many studies have examined the influence of BODs effectiveness on the performance of conventional banking industry over time, studies on the Islamic financial institutions are quite scarce. In addition, the results obtained by the studies on
Introduction
Corporate governance (CG) has become an important subject during the past two decades (Chapra and Ahmed, 2002) since the failure of Enron in 2001. In the same period, Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) have witnessed the collapse of Turkish Ihlas Finance House. The most significant reasons behind these collapses are the collusion of the board of directors (BODs), the audit failures and excessive risk taken by the management (Grais and Pellegrini, 2006) .
The framework of CG under IFIs is quite different from conventional banks, as the BODs works side by side with the Shariah supervisory board (SSB) (which is a multi-layer structure), in accordance with the Shariah principles and rules. In addition to skills that members of the BODs have in the conventional banking industry, members of an Islamic bank should have high ethical codes and professional competence in the banking field and should have a sufficient knowledge in Shariah issues pertaining to banking activities (Chapra, 2007) . According to Rachdi and Ben Ameur (2011) , CG theories attempt to treat the economic interests' conflict among all stakeholders and reduces agency costs by using internal and external corporate governance mechanisms. The BODs is considered to be the most important effective mechanism in an internal governance structure.
Due to the paucity of research in banking governance, such as board effectiveness, which requires more specific and complex monitoring mechanisms (Rachdi and Ben Ameur, 2011) . Very little is known about this issue in the Middle East, particularly, among Islamic banks of GCC countries. Furthermore, the recent financial collapses and banking distress are primarily caused by board failures (Kirkpatrick, 2009) , and the GCC Islamic banks are not exempted from these crises.
Islamic banks clearly have different governance frameworks than conventional counterparts, which aim to minimize the risks involved. According to Mollah et al. (2014) , Islamic banks have a Shariah supervisory board that works as a second layer of independent governance mechanism control to prevent the board of director and other top management from taking high-risk investment activities. On the other hand, due to Shariah restrictions, the transparency levels and the financial and risk disclosures are high in Islamic banks, which enable them to engage in less risky investments.
The GCC countries also have similar economical, political, social and cultural factors that may camouflage the differences which exist among them (Al-Muharrami and Matthews, 2009) . They also have a growing, stable and efficient financial and banking system (Al-Musali and Ismail, 2012) . In the past five years, the CG in the GCC countries have been making important developments, but have faced significant challenges regarding transparency and disclosure, board practice and risk management, IMEFM 8, 3 particularly for banks, as they represent over 60 per cent of the financial structure of the GCC region (Saidi, 2011) . Both good CG and profitable banking sector will have a positive effect on the banking system and in reducing financial shocks, and thus, contributing to the stability of the national economy and vice versa.
One of the most critical components of the internal CG of a firm to monitor the management is the BODs (Fama, 1980) , which affects a bank's performance. Pathan and Skully (2010) confirm that the BODs within banks are more important than in other industries. Board attributes can minimize both agency conflicts and agency costs (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006) , which in turn will lead to an improve corporate value. The importance of CG, particularly BODs structure refers to how a company utilizes the resources effectively to support its performance (Gregory and Simms, 1999) . The empirical findings on the relationship between the BODs' effectiveness and bank performance in previous studies were inconclusive. These results are due to econometric problems consisting of the endogeneity issue, sample-selection bias and time. This study attempts to overcome these issues. Furthermore, the evidence about bank performance in the conventional banking industry may not be generalized in the context of Islamic banks of GCC countries due to the difference in financial systems. Consequently, motivated by the need to address the determinants of GCC's Islamic banks' performance, this study aims to investigate the impact of BODs mechanisms (board size, board composition, role duality and chairman independence), Investment Account Holders (IAHs) and social contribution on the bank performance during the period of 2008-2011. This study uses a stakeholder theory from an Islamic viewpoint as the theoretical framework, which has not been used in any existing literature yet.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the Islamic finance in GCC countries. Section 3 presents the literature review. Section 4 describes the research method, and Section 5 highlights the findings. Section 6 presents the sensitivity analysis. The last section provides the summary and conclusion, including limitations and possible avenues for future research.
Overview of the Islamic finance in GCC countries
Islamic finance is still in the infancy stage that has recently gain the attention of many economists due to its rapid growth and its ability to provide a competitive markets. It is generally recognized as tools for mobilizing and allocating funds internationally. The financial industry was ranked at second place in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) contribution among the GCC countries (Al-Obaidan, 2008) . Their banks are wellcapitalized and profitable (Sturm et al., 2008) . Islamic finance institutions in GCC region have grown from two firms in 1975 (Kuwait Finance House and Dubai Islamic Bank) into more than 400 firms in 2012. Each firm offers a wide variety of Islamic financial products and services.
The GCC countries are at the center of the Islamic world and are expected to be the heart of the fast growing Islamic finance industry comprising investment and retail banking, Takaful (insurance), fund management and the issuance and trading of Shariah-compliant securities (Sukuk). The GCC countries have seen a propagation of financial centers, and Bahrain has become the main heart of Islamic banking. The GCC states have a greater ratio of Shariah-compliant financial assets and their Islamic banks' products are more innovative (Wilson, 2009) . In addition to banking, the GCC countries play an important role in the establishment of Shariah-compliant mutual funds and
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Takaful. Wilson (2009) states that the importance of these developments in the GCC countries has created a new form of Islamic capitalism.
The amount of Shariah-compliant assets is quite massive in the GCC countries, with the assets total are worth over US$536.9 billion in 2009 and expanded to around US$1,584.4 billion at the end of 2012. This means that the GCC states acquire about 34 per cent of the total assets (IFBS, 2013) . According to World Islamic Banking Competitiveness Report (2013) (2014) , in 2012, out of all the total assets owned by Islamic banks around the world, 53 per cent of the assets were located in Saudi Arabia, 24 per cent in Qatar and 17 per cent in the UAE. The total Islamic banking market share in GCC countries has increased from 22 per cent in 2008 to 78 per cent in 2012.
Literature review
Corporate governance in Islamic banks
In the Islamic context, the effective framework of CG represents a cornerstone for financial institutions to preserve the interests of all stakeholders. The stakeholders' interest is not limited to achieving profits or maximizing wealth but also to embrace the aspects of ethics, Shariah and principle of the Divine Unity of Allah. The literature in the Islamic CG provides two main frameworks. The first model is based on the principle of Shura, where the stakeholders participate in achieving the main objective, the Divine Unity of Allah (Choudhury and Hoque, 2006; Hassan, 2012) . The second model is founded on the rights of all stakeholders, not just the shareholders' interest (Chapra and Ahmed, 2002; Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2004; Wajdi, 2006) . These two models give a strong justification of the structure of Islamic CG as a stakeholder-centered framework. Furthermore, Nienhaus (2006) clarified that Islamic CG should be value-oriented and be based on the principle of social justice with regards to all stakeholders.
According to Salin et al. (2012) , the members of BODs should discharge their responsibilities and duties by making their decisions based on three fundamental principles, Tawheed, Shariah and ethics, to serve all stakeholders. They should have sufficient education and knowledge in both Shariah and Islamic banking field. Only then can the BODs perform their task effectively.
In the past decade, the extensive literature regarding the effect of BODs' structure on performance have been focusing on the conventional banking industry (Adusei, 2011; Belkhir, 2009; Juras and Hinson, 2008; Rachdi and Ben Ameur, 2011) and the findings are inconclusive. Although there are several empirical studies recently being published on Islamic banks' governance and performance, the literature on Islamic banking governance mechanisms are still quite scarce. For example, Ghayad (2008) examined the effect on the roles of both deposit holders and SSB on CG practices of Islamic banks in Bahrain and the factors that determine their performance. The study suggested that in order to encourage the bank's management to introduce new services and products in conformity with Shariah principles and rules, SSB must be widely knowledgeable in the economic and financial field. To improve the practices of CG within Islamic banks, the SSB is supposed to represent the IAHs in the BODs of the bank. The result shows that the bank's performance is not only influenced by internal quantitative factors such as financial ratios but also by external factors which are qualitative in nature, for example, managerial elements.
Al-Tamimi (2012) studied, in the first part of his research, the relationship between disclosure and transparency, compensation of executive, BODs, the interests of stakeholders and shareholders, as well as policies and compliance with the bank's CG. In the second part of his research, he examined the influence of CG of the UAE national banks on performance and financial distress. The findings show that the UAE banks are more conscious of the importance of CG factors. He also finds that the practices of CG among UAE banks are at satisfactory level. The results reveal a positive significant association between disclosure and transparency, interests of shareholders and stakeholders and the BODs' role with the practices of CG of the UAE banks. Moreover, the results show that CG practices are positively and insignificantly correlated with the level of performance, but have a positive significant impact on financial distress. However, he finds no significant difference in the level of CG practices between Islamic banks and its counterparts. Matoossi and Grassa (2014) examine the effect of CG mechanisms on the performance of 77 biggest Islamic banks and 85 conventional banks in both GCC countries and Southeast Asia countries from 2000 to 2009. They discovered several important differences between CG variables of the two types of banks. Furthermore, they noticed that the board fee, CEO duality and CEO age have a positive significant influence on the performance of Islamic banks. They also stressed the important role played by the SSB in creating the Islamic banks' value and performance.
In summary, none of the previous studies on CG of IFIs has examined the effect of BODs' characteristics on Islamic banks' performance except that of Matoossi and Grassa (2014) . The BODs' structure seemed to be a significant mechanism that could affect the performance firmly and is considered as an important factor of CG (Bhagat and Bolton, 2008) . The BODs may lead to higher monitoring and, as a result, may maximize company value and the extent to which the board will influence the performance may also depend on the attributes of this CG indicator. Thus, this study examines the impact of the board structure (board size, board composition and separation role between CEO and chairman) as well as IAHs and social contribution on Islamic banks' performance.
Hypotheses development 3.2.1 Board size and bank performance.
Board size is considered one of the main important mechanisms of CG, and therefore is affected company performance (Zahra and Pearce, 1989) . According to a stakeholder theory, an increase in the number of BODs will improve the degree of stakeholders' representation, and no individual or small group of people would dominate decision made by the board (Ghayad, 2008) .
However, empirical studies have documented several mixed results. While Juras and Hinson (2008) found that the board size has no impact on performance, Adusei (2011), Al-Saidi and Al-Sammari (2013), Belkhir (2009) and Rachdi and Ben Ameur (2011) found that a smaller board size can improve the company's performance.
From an Islamic viewpoint, a reasonable size of the board members is preferable because their experience and knowledge related to Shariah and banking issues could mitigate communication problems and, consequently, would improve performance. In the Islamic banking context, the minimum members of the BODs in the UAE should not be less than 3 and not more than 15. The board size should not be lower than 5 and 3 in Qatar and Saudi Arabia, respectively, and not exceed 11 members for both countries. The regulations of Bahrain do not identify the minimum of board size, but it should not be more than 15 members. Although the Kuwaiti CG code did not determine the
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Bank performance maximum number of the BODs for banks; however, but it should not be less than 3 directors (Al- Saidi and Al-Shammari, 2013) . Hence, the following hypothesis is developed:
H1. A higher (lower) number of board members will have greater (lesser) influence on performance.
Board composition and bank performance.
According to stakeholder perspective based on Shariah principles, in Shura principle, the BODs of Islamic banks should represent all stakeholders or the majority of them or those who have no stakes in the banks (Chapra and Ahmed, 2002) . The non-executive directors (NEDs) play a significant function as representatives and protectors of the interest of all stakeholders unlimited to only shareholders (Chilosi and Damiani, 2007) . More importantly, the main role of NEDs is to uphold social justice and welfare, and religious matters rather than maximizing shareholders' wealth (Ben-Amar and Zeghal, 2011; Nienhaus, 2006) . In the context of Islam, the directors, particularly, non-executives should have a high reputation of ethical integrity and must possess a high qualification in Islamic finance and economy to understand and solve modern issues pertaining to the banking industry, which in turn may lead to improve the overall performance.
Previous results on the relationship between the board composition and bank performance have been mixed. While, Juras and Hinson (2008) found a positive impact on performance, Al-Saidi and Al-Shammari (2013) in contrast, found a negative effect. However, Belkhir (2009) and Rachdi and Ben Ameur (2011) did not find any relationship at all. Based on the empirical results and both stakeholder and Islamic perspectives, the following hypothesis was developed:
H2. Board composition has a positive effect on bank performance.
The separation of CEO and chairman role.
Another aspect to inspect in the independence of the board is the "dominant personality" phenomena (Chapra and Ahmed, 2002) . According to Belkhir (2009) , the role duality would cause a decrease in the agency's cost and would improve its performance. This is because CEO duality leaves the authority within a firm in the hand of a single person only. This allows the CEO to manage the BODs effectively to achieve the company's goals (Belkhir, 2009) . Chapra and Ahmed (2002) recommends IFIs to separate the two roles of chairman and CEO because it will provide the necessary checks and balances of power and authority on management behavior and will, in return, protect the interest of all stakeholders. The chairman and the CEO should have excellent personal attributes such as honesty, frugality and readiness, which are mentioned in the Quran and the Sunnah to execute their role effectively (Chapra and Ahmed, 2002) .
There are evidence that proves that role duality can improve corporate performance (Pi and Timme, 1993) . However, recent studies have found no significant relationship between role duality and performance (Al-Saidi and Al-Shammari, 2013; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006) . Based on the above arguments, the following hypothesis is developed:
H3. The separation of CEO and chairman functions has a positive effect on bank performance.
Chairman independence.
The chairman's independence from the executive management is considered one of important CG mechanisms that acts to improve IMEFM 8,3
oversight and monitoring function of the board by supervising and controlling the CEO function (Abbott et al., 2004; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002) , and consequently, improve the firm's performance. In addition, a non-executive chairman may also influence the company's prospective success (Daily and Dalton, 1993) . In contrast to the conventional perspective, a Muslim leader (such as the chairman) should have the following important attributes; allegiance to Allah, pursuing for general Islamic goals in addition to stakeholders' interests, adherence to Shariah and Islamic ethics, truthfulness and honesty (Ather and Sobhani, 2008) . The Islamic view for this type of leadership is supported by the stakeholder theory which states that the chairman should have the moral obligations to lead and maintain the cooperation and coordination amongst the BODs. This, in return, can be used as a catalyst to preserve the interest of all the stakeholders, and to achieve social justice and welfare within the community. Thus, the following hypothesis is developed:
H4. Chairman independence has a positive relationship with banks' performance.
Investment account holders.
Ownership structure is another important determinant that can influence a company performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . The aggregate investment portfolio of an Islamic bank includes shareholders' equity and funds from IAHs as well as other sources available to the bank (Archer et al., 1998) . A number of studies have reviewed the influence of ownership structure on Islamic banks' performance (Abbas et al., 2009; Zouari and Taktak, 2012) . However, none of these studies has used IAHs as a mechanism of ownership structure. This study uses the same measurement that has been used by Farook et al. (2011) . Thus, the following hypothesis is developed:
H5. There is a positive relationship between the proportion of IAHs fund and Islamic banks' performance.
Social contribution.
Social contribution is considered as an important element that differentiates Islamic banks from conventional banks and as such, Zakah reporting is needed to achieve the Islamic accounting objectives (Bayoun and Willet, 2000) . Islamic banks are required to prepare the statement of sources and the uses of Zakah fund that includes the balance of undistributed Zakah and the reasons for its undistributed amount (Maali et al., 2006) . The evaluation of Islamic banks' performance should be based on the periodic Zakah payment (Hameed et al., 2011) . Zakah main contribution is to improve the quality of people's life, and eliminate, or at least alleviate, poverty within the society. It is expected that Islamic banks which have a good track record of Zakah payment would have a better performance:
H6. There is a positive relationship between social contribution and Islamic banks' performance.
Research method 4.1 Data and sample size
The sample of Islamic banks was selected from a list of IFIs on the Web site of AAOIFI (http://aaoifi.com) and AIBIM (http://aibim.com). Only full data of 40 Islamic banks in GCC countries were available to be research and investigate the
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Bank performance association between BODs' structure and IAHs with bank performance from 2008 to 2011. These years were selected because they were the most recent samples when this study was started. The sample includes 21 banks from Bahrain, 8 banks from Kuwait, three banks from Qatar, four banks from Saudi Arabia and four banks from UAE. This generates 160 bank-year observations based on a balanced panel data. This study defines full-fledged Islamic banks as any bank offering banking services and investment or those firms that conducts Modaraba and leasing transactions based on Shariah principles and rules.
Variable measurement
The data related to performance measures, BODs' attributes and control variables during the years 2008-2011 were collected from the bank's annual reports. However, only the GDP variable was obtained from the World Bank Web site (www.worldbank. org).
The two accounting measures for performance was used as the dependent variable, namely, return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). The two ratios of ROE and ROA are considered as the best tools for measuring a bank's performance (Sinkey, 2002) . These two ratios were widely used in previous studies conducted (Siddiqui, 2008; Sufian and Habibullah, 2009 ).
Control variables
In addition, three further variables were used to control other possible effects of bank performance at both the company and country level. The first control variable is bank size (Adusei, 2011; Al-Saidi and Al-Shammari, 2013; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006) . Large Islamic banks can invest financial resources in different profit-sharing instruments to diversify their risks based on Shariah principles and rules, and thus they offer their products and services at a lower cost and higher profit. Leverage is the second variable that is usually used in studies of CG (Al-Saidi and Al-Shammari, 2013; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006) . Islamic banks with a wealthy capital tend to use internal resources to finance their investments before using outside funds. Islamic banks with more assets and low debt would improve their investments, and thus their performance (Bukair, 2013) . Finally, GDP per capita is used as a country-level variable to control any differences between GCC countries. This variable is commonly used in CG studies (Cosset et al., 2012; Renders et al., 2010) . Generally, GDP has a positive effect on financial sector activities. People with a higher income in GCC tends to save more money, resulting in an increase funds of Islamic banks that lead to more investments, and thus, better performance. Table I displays the definition of the dependent, independent and control variables.
Specification of the model
This study uses panel data that give proper information on multiple statistical cases for a span of several years. This technique has a number of benefits over cross-sectional or time-series data in economic research in terms of increasing the levels of freedom and minimizing collinearity, which will improve the econometric estimates' efficiency (Shah and Khan, 2007) . Both fixed-and random-effect techniques were tested in the regression analysis. This study uses regression analysis of generalized least square (GLS) for both performance measures (ROA and ROE) to examine the relationship between the bank performance and the BODs' characteristics, IAHs and control variables. The technique IMEFM 8,3
of GLS provides a remedy for any bias of omitted variable emerging from heterogeneity, which refers to unobserved variables and time-invariant. It also provides a remedy for the endogenetic time-invariant sources. The model to test the hypotheses of the study is shown below:
PERMit ϭ ␤0 ϩ ␤1BS ϩ ␤2BC ϩ ␤3CEO ϩ ␤4CHAIR ϩ ␤5IAHs ϩ ␤6ZAK ϩ ␤7LTA ϩ ␤8LEV ϩ ␤9GDP ϩ it where:
PERM ϭ performance (using ROA and ROE); I ϭ cross-sectional unit; T ϭ time series; ␤0 ϭ intercept (has constant value); ␤1 to ␤9 ϭ the coefficients' scope; BS ϭ board size; BC ϭ board composition; CEO ϭ the separation of CEO and chairman role; CHAIR ϭ chairman independence; IAHs ϭ investment account holders; ZAK ϭ Zakah; LTA ϭ bank size; LEV ϭ leverage ratio; GDP ϭ gross domestic product per capita; and it ϭ error term. Regarding the dependent variable, the table shows that the mean for the ROA and ROE was Ϫ0.0232 and Ϫ0.0365, respectively, and these mean values are more accurate comparing to the Ϫ0.30 and Ϫ0.072 that were documented by Bukair (2013) . The negative result may due to the effects of the 2007 global financial crisis.
The BS had a mean value of 8.8, showing that the board size of Islamic banks in GCC countries consists of nearly nine executive-directors. This is in line with the best practice of CG for IFIs (Hawkamah, 2011) , who recommended that the ideal board size should not be less than seven person. The amount of the directors on the board are quite similar to 8.28, as reported in a study by Al-Saidi and Al-Shammari (2013) for Kuwaiti banks. BC had a mean value of 91.23 per cent, indicating that more than 90 per cent of directors were NEDs, and this ratio is consistent with the best practice of CG for IFIs (Hawkamah, 2011) . Al- Saidi and Al-Shammari (2013) found that 94 per cent of members in Kuwaiti banks were NEDs. The mean for the separation of CEO and chairman role is about 97 per cent, indicating that the vast majority of Islamic banks have two different persons for both functions, and this is in conformity with the best practice of CG for IFIs (Hawkamah, 2011) . This percentage is higher than 49 per cent found by Al- Saidi and Al-Shammari (2013) in Kuwaiti banks. This implies that a separate leadership structure is more common in Islamic banks than in conventional ones. CHAIR had a mean value of 87.5 per cent, indicating that most banks have a non-executive chairman and is in line with the best practice of CG for IFIs (Hawkamah, 2011) . This is higher than 24 and 53 per cent that were found by Saat et al. (2011) and Habbash et al. (2010) for Malaysian and British companies, respectively. The mean value of IAHs is about 32.70 per cent. This implies that Islamic banks of GCC depended more on the investment account equity in funding their operations than shareholders' equity, and reflects the extent of investors' confidence in Islamic banks. The value of social contribution (ZAK) is 79 per cent, implying that all Islamic banks in the sample contribute less than 1 per cent of Zakah to the community. Note: Dependent and independent variables are defined in Table I   IMEFM  8,3 As for the control variables, the mean of total assets is about $6,255 million, and 45 per cent for LEV, which are lower than $7,160 million and 47 per cent in Bukair's (2013) study, respectively. Lastly, the GDP per capita had a mean of Ϫ0.0046, indicating a reduction in the country economic development level due to the effects of global financial crisis that started in 2007. Table III demonstrates the correlation between the dependent, explanatory and control variables. Multicollinearity is considered a serious problem when the correlation between the independent variables exceeds 0.80 (Gujarati, 2004) . The highest correlation between bank size (LTA) and leverage (LEV) is 0.5095. The table indicates that Islamic banks with smaller board size, high funds from IAHs and having a non-executive chairman, have a higher performance. Table III also shows that the lower the social contribution (ZAK), LEV ratio and GDP growth, the higher the Islamic banks' performance. Table IV shows that the GLS models for both performance measures (ROA and ROE) are significant at the less than 1 per cent level. The R 2 for ROA and ROE are 0.2717 and 0.3153, respectively, indicating that 27 and 31 per cent variance in both measures of performance is interpreted by six explanatory and three control variables.
GLS model findings
BS has a negative effect on performance, and is significant with ROE, but not with ROA. Thus, H1 is rejected. The negative sign indicates that the directors in Islamic banks' boards are not selected based on their expertise and experience, but more often for fulfilling the requirements of CG codes in GCC region. This result is in line with the study by Rachdi and Ben Ameur (2011) for Tunisian banks. The results of both measures implies that a smaller board makes quicker decisions and play an effective role in monitoring performance and creating value for GCC Islamic banks.
The ratio of NEDs on the board (BC) has a significant negative effect on performance, and therefore H2 is rejected. However, this finding is consistent with previous studies by Al -Saidi and Al-Shammari (2013) . The findings contradict the stakeholder theory from an Islamic perspective that the presence of NEDs improves bank performance. This is due to the lack of banking and Shariah knowldege of the NEDs, which reduces the monitoring efficiency and resulting in poor performance. The results indicate that a larger number of NEDs on the board is not effective in controlling mangers or in curtailing shareholders' power for appointing NEDs in Islamic banks.
The separation of CEO and chairman roles is negatively insignificant with the performance. Thus, H3 is rejected. This finding is compatible with Al-Saidi and Al-Shammari's (2013) study for Kuwaiti banks. However, the results are inconsistent with stakeholder and Islamic perspectives, which states that the two roles should not be held by the same person, as set in the best practice of CG and regulations for IFIs (Chapra and Ahmed, 2002; Hawkamah, 2011) . These results are supported by a research conducted by Abdul Rahman and Haniffa (2002) , who found that role duality leads to a weaker board potency and results in poor performance. The results imply that the chairman of the BODs in GCC Islamic banks has strong voice in choosing and in appointing the CEO. Another explanation is, role duality enhances decision-making by focusing more on the bank strategic goals, and allows the CEO to form the fate of the bank with minimal BODs intervention, resulting in improved performance.
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Bank performance Table III Notes: * , ** and *** are significant at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively; dependent and independent variables are defined in Table I IMEFM 8,3 Notes: * , ** and *** are significant at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively; dependent and independent variables are defined in Table I 303 Bank performance A non-executive chairman has a positive and significant effect on ROE, but insignificant effect on the ROA. Thus, H4 is confirmed for ROE, but is rejected for ROA. This outcome is in line with the Islamic and stakeholder perspectives who suggested that the non-executive chairman can enhance CG-quality by improving BODs monitoring to control the CEO function to serve the interest of all stakeholders and to achieve social justice and welfare objectives within the society.
However, the BODs does not seem to be an important indicator for measuring the performance of Islamic banks. This finding contradicts the fundamental debates of this paper which states that the BODs of Islamic banks enhances the management in improving the performance. This could be the result of a weak monitoring ability or an ineffective supervisory board in Islamic banks because the person who appoints NEDs on the boards is the shareholders.
The insignificance of IAHs implies that Islamic banks improve their performance in order to maximize shareholders wealth rather than other investors, which is contrary to stakeholder and Islamic perspectives. This result suggests that Islamic banks' managers should act to preserve the interest of all stakeholders, not only shareholders.
Table IV also shows that Zakah (ZAK) has no effect on performance. This implies that the social contribution of Islamic banks does not affect their performance. This result is in contrast to the expectation that the Zakah paid would improve bank performance according to the Quran and the Sunnah.
Regarding control variables, bank size (LTA) has a highly significant positive association with performance, which confirm the results of Al-Saidi and Al-Shammari (2013). The finding indicates that large Islamic banks have lower costs of information collection, more resources and lower risks in financial markets resulting in better performance. The results suggest that, due to stiff competition, smaller Islamic banks need to maximize their efficiency and productivity to remain profitable, and more importantly, to survive. Furthermore, leverage (LEV) has a highly significant negative effect on performance, and the findings are consistent with previous studies (Al -Saidi and Al-Shammari, 2013; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006) . This result suggested that Islamic banks prefer to utilize their internal sources to finance their investments rather than obtaining outside funds. Their business transactions are expected to reduce risks due to different profit-sharing instruments used. Interestingly, GDP has an insignificant negative effect on performance. This is consistent with Zeitun (2012) in the case of Islamic banks. The findings can be attributed to the financial crisis that started in 2007, which reduced the GDP growth of GCC countries, and indirectly affecting banks' activities and their performance.
Sensitivity analysis
The findings of sensitivity analysis are shown in Table IV (columns 2 and 4). These columns demonstrate the findings of the primary model after excluding the year of financial crisis (2008) . The findings of these models are almost similar to the main model and therefore are not reported here.
Conclusion
The aim of this study is to analyze the influence of board attributes, IAHs and social contribution on bank performance for a sample of 40 Islamic banks in GCC countries IMEFM 8,3 during a period of 2008-2012 by utilizing the stakeholder framework. The GLS model is used to test such relationship.
The findings show that Islamic banks' performance is not derived by the corporate mechanism of the BODs, ownership structure and social contribution. The findings fail to reject the hypotheses that the BODs, IAHs and Zakah improve Islamic banks' performance. Boards dominated by NEDs have zero effect on bank performance as they have insufficient Shariah and banking knowledge due to the fact that they are appointed by shareholders. A non-executive chairman has the ability to diligently practice its expected function in protecting the interest of all stakeholders, and has the authority to realize economic and social objectives that are in conformity with Shariah principles and rules. Furthermore, the NEDs tend to not fulfill any supervisory functions, limiting their role to only establish general Islamic banks' strategies and policies. Moreover, the results have proven that the management seems to preserve only the interest of shareholders rather than other investors such as IAHs.
The findings of this paper are considered to be a valuable source of knowledge for policymakers and regulators in several ways. First, it may help GCC Islamic banking regulators in creating strategies towards improving the performance and yield a better value creation. Furthermore, GCC Islamic banking policymakers should assess the proper board size in consideration each individual bank. Finally, Islamic banking policymakers of GCC countries should revise the CG requirements on the selection of NEDs and impose limits on appointing the board in order to strengthen its structure and composition to develop the board processes and decisions making which will give rise to a better performance.
This study has its own limitations that can provide opportunities for future research. First, although the model has explored a significant part of the variation in bank performance, the major factors in the model are unexplained due to the limitations the data available. As such, future research may use other mechanisms of CG, including the remuneration and nominating committees, the top five largest shareholders and managerial shareholdings. These features have been found to be influential theoretically and empirically in CG studies under the conventional banking. Probably, some of these factors may be applicable to Islamic banks. Next, there is a need to study the impact of CG changes on Islamic banks' performance in the short-, mid-and long-term. Finally, the sample is limited to Islamic banks in GCC countries. Thus, future research may extend the sample to all Middle East countries or by conducting comparative study between Islamic banks operating in Islamic countries and Western countries.
